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R. v. Vetrovec*: 




T h e appellants were charged (along with seven others) with conspiracy 
to traffic in heroin. T he  issue arose in connection with the testimony of 
Langvand, an accomplice o f  the accused.
T he  Trial Ju d g e  instructed the jury that although they could convict 
on the testimony o f an accomplice, it was dangerous to do so, unless his 
testimony was corroborated . T he  Trial Ju d g e  then charged the jury on the 
m eaning o f corroboration and stated that the only rational conclusion was 
that Langvand was an accomplice. T h e  Appellants appealed on the basis 
that the Trial Ju d g e  erred  by finding that certain evidence was capable of 
having a corroborative effect.
T h e  British Columbia C ourt o f  Appeal held that the evidence outlined 
by the Trial Ju d g e  could be characterized as corroborative evidence on the 
basis that it tended to connect the accused with the crim e charged.
T he  Suprem e C ourt of Canada, in dismissing the appeal, reviewed 
and rejected the Accomplice C orroboration Rule.
Background
As A udrey W akeling has pointed out:
I h o se  r u le s  of c o r r o b o r a t i o n  whit  li w e  h a v e ,  with  t h e  e x c e p t io n  of |x*i |in \ 
a n d  t r e a s o n ,  a r e  relat ively re c e n t  i n v e n t io n s  o! t h e  |u d i< i .n \  a n d  th e  legis 
l a tu r e  b a s e d  o n  e x p e r i e n c e  th a t  c e r t a in  k in d s  o t  w itnesses  a t e  m u e l i a h l e  <>i 
t h a t  in sp e c i f ie d  c a u s e s  of  a c t io n  to«» f re q u e n t ly  in su f f ic ien t  e v id e n c e  is 
a d d u c e d  . . M a i n  of t h e  m o d e r n  t i i les  r e q u i t i n g  coi l o l x i i a t i o n  s i . n u d  .is 
r u le s  of p r u d e n c e  in t h e  h n g l i s h  c o n n s  W ith  r e sp e c t  to  a c c o m p l ic e  testt- 
m o n v  t h e  o r ig in a l  q u e s t i o n  vs.is u h e t h c i  a n  a t t o m p l i t c  vs.is .1 1 o m p c t e u i  
w itness  a t  all. O n e  e  h e  v\as ree cm v eel .is .i v\ it ness  .me I t h e  1 c a l l / .t in >11 d e v e l o p e d  
th a t  t h e r e  w e r e  q u a l i t a t iv e  d i f f e r e n c e s  . l in o n i ’ tlit* te s t im o n v  of chlicic-nt 
w i tnesses  t r ia l  j u d g e s  In-gan to  w a r n  t h e  ) iuv .  to  d i s c o u r a g e  .1 c o n v ic t io n  
f o u n d e d  solelv 011 tf ie uncen  ro lx n  ateel te s t im o n v  of  .111 ac e <u n p in  e. I lie 1 n le 
t h a t  sue h a w a r n i n g  s h o u l d  l>e g iv en  was .1 1 u le  of p r a t  t u e  o n lv .  a n d  fa i lu ie  
to  give it w o u ld  no t  r e su l t  111 a c o n v ic t io n  I n i n g  (|ii.ishe<l unti l  t h e  pass ing  
of  tl ie  C r im in a l  A p p e a l s  Ac t m  1 ‘.*07 As 1.01 el R e a d in g  said m H v litiskt r, 1II1 
m I91*>:
lAi \ Vr trover ( 1 M K 2 |  I S t .  R  M i l
CASE COMMENTS  •  NOTES  •  CHRONIQUE DE JURISPRUDENCE 343
T his rule o f  practice has becom e virtually equivalent to a rule of law. and  
since the Court o f  Crim inal Appeal Act cam e into operation , this court has 
held that, in the absence o f  such a warning by the ju d g e , the conviction  
must be quashed .2
T h e Accomplice C orroboration  Rule arose in consequence o f the d an ­
ger o f convicting a person upon the unconfirm ed testimony o f a criminal. 
What was required  was some supporting  evidence which would aid in 
determ ining the tru th  o f the accomplice’s story so that it would be consid­
ered  safe to act upon .1
T he “rule,” as discussed in R. v. Basken'ille, ‘ was adopted in C anada 
in Horsburgh v. The Queen* (a case involving allegations o f sexual immorality 
against an ordained  Minister). I he children in that case were called as 
witnesses for the Crown. T h e  Suprem e C ourt o f  C anada found that the 
T rial Judge had erred  in holding that the children were not accomplices, 
and by not giving a w arning to the jury. T h e  C ourt stated:
It is now  se ttled  law that in a cr im in a l trial, w h ere  a p erso n  w h o  is an  
acco m p lice  g iv es  e v id e n c e  o n  b e h a lf  o f  th e  p ro se cu tio n , it is th e  d u ty  o f the  
Judge to  w arn th e  jury that, a lth o u g h  th ey  m ay con v ict u p o n  his e v id en ce , 
it is d a n g e r o u s  to  d o  so  u n le ss  it is corrob orated ."
In o rd e r to understand  the developm ent o f the “ru le”, and the effect 
o f R. v. Vetrover, the rationale behind the rule, as well as the criticisms, 
should be considered.
Many o f the most com m on and im portant requirem ents for a co rro ­
borative, or cautionary, instruction have been justified on the same grounds 
that the ancient rules with respect to the incom petence o f witnesses were 
justified. Put simply, it was felt that an accomplice would be unreliable. 
O ne o f the dangers o f accepting the testimony of an accomplice was that, 
even if a man was certain to be found guilty, he might seek the avoidance 
o r reduction o f his punishm ent by assisting the Crown in prosecuting the 
accused. A nother danger in accepting the testimony o f an accomplice was 
that where the witness was proved to be an accomplice, lie may attem pt to 
show that his participation in a crim e, as com pared to those charged, was 
o f a m inor nature. A th ird  reason for requiring the accomplice corrobor­
ation rule was that the accomplice would probably be a close acquaintance 
o f the person who actually com m itted the crime, and as such, would much 
ra ther see an innocent person convicted than a friend. T he final rationale 
for the rule, which was m ore prevalent in the earlier cases, is based 011 the 
moral guilt o f the witnesses, i.e., that a witness who has himself com m itted 
a crime, should not be believed.7
'(.orToboTdtwn in C.anaduin I.au ( I n r o n l o  Carswel l .  I '.177). at K M  I.
'H \ Raxkrrvillr | I 9 l t i |  2 k  B 6 58 .  at t>6l-i>65 
'Ibul . at 65 8  
*( I 9 6 7 |  S < R 7lt>
"¡bui , at 754.
I I) H e v d e n .  " I h e  C o n o b o i a t i o n  o i A u o i n p l u e s ’ ( 1973). I .n m  / Hr> 2*>4 at 2 6 5 - 6
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O ne of the m ajor advantages of the “ru le” is that it provides protection 
for the accused f rom  false accusations. T he ef fect o f  a w arning is to alert 
the ju ry  to the unreliability o f  accomplice evidence. However, the “ru le” 
has been criticized.H
T h ere  are  four m ajor argum ents levelled against the m andatory re­
quirem ent of a corroborating warning. First, the caution that must be given 
to the jury can, in some cases, become so com plicated that it impedes, 
ra ther than assists, a jury in evaluating the evidence. Second, the complexity 
of the w arning leads to judicial erro rs, resulting in appeals. T h ird , in some 
cases, motive to give perju red  testimony is not present o r apparen t, vet the 
warning is still required. I'he rule determ ines—in advance of (lie testim ony. 
and in ignorance of the particular facts su rround ing  the case, including 
the accomplice's own credibility—that an accomplice’s testimony may be 
unreliable. Fourth, the ru le assumes that the jurors will m ore likely be 
misled by the testimony o f an accomplice, than In ano ther witness who 
may have a m ore com pelling reason to mislead.
In summary, the law prior to R. v. Vetrtwec dictated that where a witness 
testifying for the prosecution might be found to Ik* an accomplice, the I rial 
|u d ge was required to give the jury a corroboration warning. It was nec­
essary to put the warning to the jury with almost mathematical precision, 
with no regard to the nature of the* c harge, the circumstances of the ease-, 
or the personality of the accom plice. I lie- prope r procedure was foi the- 
Trial Judge to direct the jury on: (I) what an accomplice is. (2) if they 
found the witness to Ik* an accom plice, that it would Ik* unsafe to convict 
upon his uncorroborated testimony. (3) that tlie\ mav convict upon liis 
uncorroborated testimony it they are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he is telling the truth, (4) what corroboration is. (.“>) what evidence* is 
capable o f lK*ing corroborative, and ((>) that the*\ must be* satisfied beyond  
a reasonable doubt of the* guilt of the* accuse*d lK*fore* tlie v can convict."
The Principal Case
Mr. Justice Dickson, speaking for a unanim ous Supreme* Court of 
Canada, expressly indicated that he* in tended to i e*\ie*w and to t e a s s e s s  ilie- 
general com m on law (as opposed to statute law) prim  iples ielating to cor­
roboration, as they applied to accomplices.'" lie* was of the* opinion that 
the corroboration of accomplices was one* of the* most unnecessarily com ­
plicated and technical areas of the* law. and thus rc*quired re fo rm .11
T he rationale for re-evaluating the law o f  accomplice* eoi m boiation 
was perce*ive*d by the Court to be twofold, l u s t ,  w a s  “the* me leasing length
M.av» Kt i n i m C o m m is s io n  ot ( .ni.ul.i h i i l t ' i n i  C 01 i o I m n a t io n  \  Simlv I’ajMi |>i<|>.nt<l In tli< I ,m <>I 
Kwdeiuc- P rojec t."  O t ta w a  (1*I7.V|, at V | 0
'*.Nufna, footnote- '1. at I0.r> 
["Sufna , tool no te  I
and com plexity of criminal trials”, particularly in the area of white collar 
crime; and second, was an “apparent trend" in the English courts, as well 
as the Canadian courts, to overcom e the technicalities surrounding the 
concept of corroboration and to “return to the conceptual basics."'-
T he C ourt indicated that there  was nothing in the evidence of an 
accomplice which should automatically ren d er his testimony untrustw orthy. 
As Dickson J. states:
l o  con stru ct a u n iversa l ru le  s in g lin g  out a cco m p lices, th e n , is to  fasten  
u|M>n this branch  of th e  law of e v id e n c e  a b lind  and e m p t\ fo r m a lism .1;
In discarding the Accomplice C orroboration Rule-, the Court found 
that there were at least th ree difficulties associated with the Hasken'ille 
decision (upon which the rule was based) as follows: ( I ) it tends to confuse 
the reason behind the warning, (2) the law surrounding  the teiu i ‘'corro­
boration" has become increasingly complex and technical, and (!i) tlu- litis 
ken ille  definition is unsound in princip le."
T he Court was cognizant ol tlie* fact that the effect of tlu- judgm ent 
in R \ . Yetnwec would be to allow tlie I rial Judge much m ore discretion 
in dec iditig w hether o r not a jur\ should be warned tone ern ing  the1 clangers 
of convicting solelv upon the* testim om  of .in accom pilee.1' 1 he- ( o u r t  stated 
that, intei aim . rat hot than attem pting to eategori/e .i witness, identify mg 
corroborative evidence, and w arning the jury; the 1 rial Judge should be 
concerned with the c redibilitx of tlu1 witness. II in the* opinion ol the I i ial 
Judge. tlu- credibiluN of the witness is questionable, then the I rial Judge 
lias the- disc ret ion to warn the jur\ ac < ordinglx . in .tm c ase. II on tin.* otliei 
hand, tlit* lii.tl Judge concludes that the credibility ol the' witness is un ­
impeachable*. then regardless ol w hether the witness is lec Imic .ill\ .in ac ­
complice. tlu* I li.il Judge would not have to give* .i warning to the* ju r\.
I lie Court in Yt’lrovi't extended the com m on sense approach, which 
is outlines! in the* case* <>l W mkcntni it. al. \ .  The (¿ucrn"\ and cited with 
approval the* dicta ol de C ran d p re  | in the following in.inner:
( leu t ob ot  at ion is not a w o r d  of  a i t .  It is a m a l l e i  ol  < < >mm< m sc* use.  In i re t i n  
w a r s ,  thi s  ( emi t  ha s  r cpeatcel lx  r e f u s e d  to y i w  a n a r i e m  legalistic l e a d i n g  
nt that woi e l  .met to i m p o s e  u p o n  I n a l  j u d g e s  art i f i c ial  i r s i r a i n l s  in t hr u  
d i s t i n c t i o n s  to j i n i r s  01  to t h e m s c h r s .1
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T h e ef fect o f  R. v. Vetrovec on the Accomplice C orroboration Rule can 
be clearly stated by quoting Dickson J.
The Law of Corroboration is unduly and unnecessarily complex and tech­
nical. I would hold that there is no special category for “accomplices”. An 
accomplice is to be treated like any other witness testifying at a criminal 
trial and the judge’s conduct, if he chooses to give his opinion, is governed 
by the general rules.IH
Conclusion
R. v. Vetrovec does have an im portant impact on criminal law practice. 
However, despite first appearances, the Suprem e C ourt o f Canada has 
taken a cautious approach to this troublesom e problem . While abandoning 
the necessity for a strict application of the Accomplice C orroboration Rule, 
discretion has been left in the Trial Judge to give a corroboration w arning 
where it is felt that such a w arning is desirable. In the final analvsis, what 
has really changed is that the w arning is 110 longer m andatory.
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